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COMMENTS
REQUIRED RECORDS DOCTRINE--THE PRIVILEGE
AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION, THE NATIONAL
FIREARMS ACT AND THE FEDERAL
WAGERING TAX
Uncertainty about the central purpose of the privilege
against self-incrimination, among Justices of the United
States Supreme Court as well as among the self-appointed
critics and defenders of the Court, has deepened in recent
years.
The required records doctrine, as expressed in Shapiro v.
United States' and later in United States v. Kahriger2 and
Lewis v. United States3 was considered ripe for consideration
by the United States Supreme Court after hearing the arguments of Marchetti v. United States' and Grosso v. United
States.' The latter two cases were argued together on January 17 and 18, 1967, but no decision was made on the basis
of those arguments. Instead, the cases were restored to the
docket for reargument in the October, 1967 Term. But then
further questions were asked. In Marchetti the court requested discussion of the following additional questions :6
(1) What relevance, if any, has the required records
doctrine, as developed in Shapiro v. United
States, 335 U.S. 1, to the validity under the fifth
amendment of the registration and special occupational tax requirements of 26 USC § 4411,
4412 (1964) 1
(2) Can an obligation to pay the special occupational tax required by 26 USC § 4411 (1964) be
satisfied without filing the registration statement provided for by 26 USC § 4412 (1964) L.
and in Grosso the court asked for discussion of these similar,
but slightly different questions :'
1.
2.
8.
4.
5.
6.
7.
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What relevance, if any, has the required records
doctrine, Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1,
to the validity under the fifth amendment of the
obligation to pay the wagering excise tax imposed by 26 USC § 4401 (1964)?.

(2) Is satisfaction of an obligation to pay a wagering excise tax imposed by 26 USC § 4401 conditioned upon the filing of a return required
under 26 USC § 6011 and pertinent regulations?
If it is not, what information, if any, must
accompany the payment of a wagering tax obligation in order to extinguish the taxpayer's
liability for that obligation?
The combination of questions suggests that the Court
believed these cases presented an appropriate vehicle for
reconsideration of several aspects of the required-records
doctrine and the privilege against self-incrimination.
The balance of this comment will be devoted to analyzing
the effect the required-records doctrine has had on the
privilege against self-incrimination and some perspective on
what effect it should have in the future. Since it is not the
purpose of this comment to analyze all areas of the privilege
against self-incrimination, only brief references shall be made
to those other areas of self-incrimination important in order
to develop the historical background or to draw a needed
comparison.
HISTORY

OF THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION

The origin of the privilege is found in the historic English
opposition to the inquisitorial procedure of the ecclesiastical
and high prerogative courts, particularly the hated oath ex
officio by which clerics and later government officials interrogated suspected persons to discover heresey or political
deviation.' In America the use of compelled testimony against
revolutionaries in the prerogative courts of the colonial governors was in part responsible for elevating the privilege as
developed in England to constitutional status.' The citizen's
8. See 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2250 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
9. See Pittman, The Constitutional and Colonial History of the Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination in America, 21 VA. L. REV. 763, 764-66, 783
(1935).
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privilege to refuse to disclose information that would tend to
be incriminating was guaranteed against invasion by the
federal government in the fifth amendment of the Constitution and recently made binding upon the states through the
fourteenth amendment.1" The general language that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself" leaves the scope and extent of the privilege
largely undefined. Since the scope and extent of the privilege
is undefined (unlike the first amendment which at least
confines disputes to the factual aspects of what is reasonable)
it is difficult to state a convenient formula which will fairly
balance the interests involved. Although most seem to believe
that the privilege is "one of the great land marks in man's
struggle to make himself civilized,"" many are reluctant to
accept the logical consequences of a generous interpretation
of the privilege, particularly in view of the shelter it affords
the guilty and the nonconformist.
The privilege against self-incrimination, enhanced by its
historical role of safeguarding individual freedom from arbitrary government prosecuton, has in recent times come increasingly into conflict with the legitimate governmental need
to acquire and use information to effectively fulfill a proper
role in modern society.'" Confronted by this conflict, supporters of the privilege have conjured up the historical evils
the privilege was designed to prevent and have suggested the
desirability of unqualified application in all cases arguably
within its scope. 3 As Mr. Justice Frankfurter observed in
Ullmann v. United States, 4 the history of the privilege establishes that "it is not to be interpreted literally". Rather, the
"sole concern [of the privilege] is, as its name indicates, with
the danger to a witness forced to give testimony leading to
the infliction of penalties affixed to criminal acts. "
In 1886, in Boyd v. United States,6 the books and papers
of individual citizens were held protected by the privilege
10. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
11.

GRISWOLD, THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TODAY, 7 (1955).

12. See Meltzer, Required Records, The MeCarren Act, and the Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination,18 U. CHI. L. REv. 687, 688 (1951).
13. See GRISWOLD, supra note 11 at 7-9, 61, 75.
14. 350 U.S. 422, 426 (1956).
15. Id. at 438-39.
16. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
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against self-incrimination. Emphasizing the "indefeasible
right of ... private property,"' 7 the United States Supreme
Court struck down a subpoena duces tecum for compulsory
production of such material as being repugnant to the fourth
and fifth amendments. On its face, the decision suggested a
broad restriction on the Government's ability to compel disclosure of any private records or papers. However, the need
to acquire essential information for effective programs of
taxation and regulation of interstate commerce compelled
judicial limitation of the Boyd decision to permit required
disclosure of documents kept by corporations. Thus the privilege has been limited to "natural persons,""8 a term construed by a great majority of the courts to apply only to
individuals. By this point in time the ground work was laid
for the required records doctrine. A protection from use of
their records in criminal prosecutions has been denied to
corporations,1 9 labor unions,2" and partnerships2-in short, to
all groups having a character "so impersonal" that they cannot be said to "embody or represent the purely private or
personal interest of the constituents." 2
THE REQURED RECORDS DOCTRINE

In Shapiro v. United States," decided in 1948, the Supreme Court interpreted the immunity provisions of the
Emergency Price Control Act 4 to confer immunity only upon
a witness required to present evidence covered by the privilege
against self-incrimination. The records required to be kept
by OPA regulations in this instance were the ordinary busi17. Id. at 630.
18. See United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944), Communist Party of
the United States v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 223 F.2d 531 (D.C.
Cir. 1954), rev'd on other grounds 351 U.S. 115 (1956).
19. See Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 382 (1911); United States v.
Bausch & Lomb Optical Co. 321 U.S. 707, 726-27 (1944); 78 HARv. L. REv.
455 (1964).
20. See United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944).
21. See United States v. Silverstein, 314 F.2d 789 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied,
374 U.S. 807 (1963); 63 COLUM L. REv. 1319 (1963); United States v.
Onassis, 133 F. Supp. 327 (S.D. N.Y. 1955).
22. United States v. White, supra note 20, at 701.
23. 335 U.S. 1 (1948).
24. 56 STAT. 23 (1942), as amended, 50 U.S.C. § 922(g) (1944): "No person
shall be excused from complying with any requirements under this section
because of his privilege against self-incrimination but the immunity provisions of the Compulsory Testimony Act of February 11, 1893 (U.S.C. 1934
edition, title 49, Sec. 46), shall apply with respect to any individual who
specifically claims such privilege."
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ness records of the individual, which were held not to be
within the reach of the privilege.
The Court reasoned that as a result of the record-keeping
requirement the private records became public records over
which the record-keeper lost control. By using this simple
judicial bootstrap, the Court opened the door to Congress to
by-pass the privilege against self-incrimination in every commercial or even purely private transaction that might conceivably be regulated by Congress.
In Shapiro the court listed twenty-six statutes, covering
most of the important regulatory agencies with parallel provisions requiring information. 5 The usefulness of the recordkeeping requirement has caused further proliferation of such
statutes, as we will see later in this paper. Mr. Justice Jackson, in his dissent in Shapiro, noted the potential for dangerous expansion of the doctrine announced by the majority:
The protection against compulsory self-incrimination
guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment, is nullified to
whatever extent this court holds that Congress may
require a citizen to keep an account of his deeds and
misdeeds and turn over or exhibit the record on
demand of government inspectors, who then can use
it to convict him..."
SELF-INCIMINATION VERSus REQUIRED INOIBEMATION

F ollowing the Shapiro case, the United States Supreme
Court struggled with the need to protect the individual versus
the need of regulatory statute requirements for information
-now partially labeled the required records doctrine. Five
years after the Shapiro decision the Supreme Court considered a parallel provision requiring information. The Gambler's Registration Act, incorporated in the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954,7 imposes a tax of fifty dollars per year on
persons engaged in the business of accepting wagers, and
requires that those who are subject to the tax register with
the Internal Revenue Service, listing both name and place of
business. The statutory compulsion to admit gambling was
25. Shapiro v. United States, supra note 23, at 6.
26. Id. at 70-71.
27. 26 U.S.C. §§ 4401 (c), 4411, 4412 (1964).
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challenged in Kahrigerv. United States28 as a violation of the
privilege against self-incrimination. The Supreme Court,
after finding a valid exercise of the taxing power, distinguished between admitting anticipated conduct and past conduct. The Supreme Court reasoned that the provision, therefore, was outside the scope of the privilege which related
"only to past acts, not to future acts that may or may not
be committed"."
0 a 1955 case involving unlawIn Lewis v. United States,"
ful gambling in the District of Columbia, the Court again
denied the privilege in an analysis reminiscent of the waiver
rationale: "The only compulsion under the Act is that requiring the decision which would-be gamblers must make at
the threshold. They give up gambling, but there is no constitutional right to gamble. If they elect to -wager... they must
pay the tax.""'
In its last four consecutive terms, the United States
Supreme Court has answered more questions about the privilege against self-incrimination than in its entire previous
history. In 1964 the Supreme Court held the privilege fully
applicable to the states through the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment.5 2
The 1965 case of Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Board33 represents one more unsuccessful attempt to
secure the registration (and to subject to criminal penalties)
of the Communist Party and some of its individual members.
When the Party failed to register with the Attorney General
of the United States pursuant to a Control Board order previously sustained by the Supreme Court,"4 the Attorney General invoked other provisions of the Subversive Activities
Control Act of 1950"5 that authorized him to require registration by individual members. The Supreme Court, however,
28. 345 U.S. 22(1953).
29. Id. at 32; See United States v. Joseph, 278 F.2d 504 (3d Cir. 1960); United
States v. Ansani, 138 F. Supp. 451, 543-54 (N.D. Il1. 1955) ; United States
v. Forester, 105 F. Supp. 136 (ND. Ga. 1952).
30. 348 U.S. 419 (1955).
31. Id. at 422-23.
32. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
33. 382 U.S. 70 (1965).
34. Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control Bd.,
367 U.S. 1 (1961).
35. 50 U.S.C. § 786(d)(4) (1964).
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refused to enforce the order because it violated the privilege
against self-incrimination. The court went on to say, "if the
admission cannot be compelled in oral testimony, we do not
see how compulsion in writing makes a difference for constitutional purposes.'"'" The court distinguished United States
v. Sullivan, 7 in which a conviction had been upheld for failure
to file an income tax return, on two theories:
(1) The questions in the income tax return "were neutral on
their face and directed at the public at large, but here they
are directed at a highly selective group inherently suspect of
criminal activities"" and (2) that "[i]f the form of return
provided called for answers that the defendant was privileged
from making he could have raised the objection in the return,
but could not on that account refuse to make any return at
all." 9 The Court in Albertson did not even mention Kahriger
or Lewis in which the registration requirement was similar.
This now brings us to the October, 1967 Term of the
Supreme Court, in which the court asked for argument on
the required records doctrine and privilege against selfincrimination in Grosso and Marchetti as pointed out earlier
in this paper. The several theories under which recordkeeping requirements had been sustained up to this time may
be summarized as follows:
(1) Denial of the privilege to custodians. Shapiro
adopted the extreme example of this rationale
with the notion that records originally private
became public when required to be kept by Congress, so that the record-keeper became a mere
custodian.
(2) Suspension of the privilege by implied waiver.
The implied waiver concept was used in Lewis
to hold that the individual who wishes to engage
in an activity subject to regulation, must accept
the conditions thereto.
(3) Required statements concerning criminal activity. This category includes such cases as Kah,riger,Lewis and possibly Albertson where the
registration requirement was directed at persons
86.
37.
38.
39.

Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., supra note 33, at 78.
274 U.S. 259 (1927).
Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., supra note 33, at 79.
United States v. Sullivan, supra note 37, at 263.
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who had in the past been, or would in the future
be, engaged in gambling activities that are unlawful in most states.
(4) Information required by the needs of government. Where all else fails, some courts have
simply denied the privilege in direct reliance
on the compelling need of the Government for
information.
In answer to their own question (quoted earlier) of what
relevance, if any, the required records doctrine (Shapiro) has
to the validity under the fifth amendment of the federal
wagering registration and special occupational tax" the Supreme Court in Marchetti on January 29, 1968 held "that
neither Shapiro nor the cases upon which it relied are applicable here."4 Thus, in effect, the Supreme Court said the
requiring of information to be kept as in Shapiro could not
be applied to the gambling situation in Marchetti.
The United States argued that a distinction existed between maintaining records as in Shapiro and submitting
reports as was required in Marchetti. The Supreme Court in
rejecting the distinction said: "We perceive no meaningful
difference between an obligation to maintain records for
inspection, and such an obligation supplemented by a requirement that those records be filed periodically with officers of
42
the United States."
The Supreme Court gave three reasons for distinguishing
Shaprio from the Marchetti case. (1) Petitioner, Marchetti,
was not obliged to keep and preserve records of a kind he has
customarily kept. (2) Whatever "public aspects" there were
to the records at issue in Shapiro, there were none to the information demanded from Marchetti:
The government's anxiety to obtain information
known to a private individual does not without
more, render that information public; if it did, no
room would remain for the application of the constitutional privilege. Nor does it stamp information
with a public character that the government has
formalized its demands in the attire of a statute;
40. 26 U.S.C. §§ 4411, 4412 (1964).
41. 390 U.S. 39, 56 (1968).
42. Id.
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if this alone were sufficient, the constitutional privilege could be entirely abrogated by any Act of
Congress."3
(3) The requirements at issue in Shapiro were imposed in an
essentially non-criminal and regulatory area of inquiry while
those in Marchetti were directed to a "selective group inherently suspect of criminal activities."
In reversing the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, the
Supreme Court in Marchetti did rule the wagering tax provisions unconstitutional, but did rule that contrary to the
court's earlier opinions in Kahriger and Lewis those who
properly assert the constitutional privilege as to these provisions may not be criminally punished for failure to comply
with their requirements.
Grosso, argued and decided in conjunction with Marchetti, used the same reasoning expressed in Marchetti to
dispose of the required records doctrine.
The third case decided on January 29, 1968, along with
Marchetti and Grosso, was Haynes v. United States.4 4 Again
the Supreme Court disposed of the required records doctrine
by use of the reasoning expressed in Marchetti as discussed
above. The defendant in the Haynes case was charged under
the National Firearms Act' of knowingly possessing a firearm in violation of 26 U.S.C. Section 5851 (1964) which had
not been registered with the Secretary of the Treasury or
his delegate as required by Section 5841. The Supreme Court
held that a proper claim of the constitutional privilege against
self-incrimination provides a full defense to prosecutions
either for failure to register a firearm under Section 5841
or for possession of an unregistered firearm under Section
5851.
In all three cases, Marchetti, Grosso and Haynes, the
Supreme Court stressed the following considerations which
were used to distinguish and decide the cases:
(1)

The obligation to register and pay the tax created for the taxpayer "real and appreciable"

43. Marchetti v. United States, supra note 41, at 57.
44. 390 U.S. 85 (1968).
45. 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-928 (1968).
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and not merely "imaginary" and "unsubstantial" hazards of self-incrimination.
The statutes in question were aimed at a highly
selective group inherently suspect of criminal
activities.
(3) The information required was not "public" in
nature but private information desired by the
government to be used in criminal prosecutions.

(2)

(4) The true purpose of the statutes was not to
collect tax revenue, as evidenced by the total
collected thereunder, but to aid in law enforcement.
It seems obvious the Supreme Court has adopted a new
attitude on requiring information versus the privilege against
self-incrimination. Ironically it seems to reflect both the
attitude of the early colonial days when the privilege was
given a constitutional status, and that of today's younger
generation crying out for more freedom from the oppressions
of big government.
Using the four considerations stressed by the Supreme
Court in Marchetti, Grosso and Haynes in ruling that the
required records doctrine did not apply, I submit that similar
regulatory provisions may in the future fall to the newly
strengthened privilege against self-incrimination.
Section 4722 requires registration by those engaged in
dealing with narcotic drugs, while Section 4753 requires the
same of those who deal in marijuana. Section 4704 and Section 4744 enforce the statutes respectively by declaring it
to be unlawful to handle drugs and marijuana without
paying the tax, the result being a stiff penalty as imposed
by Section 7237. Upon request, a list of those who have registered will be furnished by the Treasury Department. A
statute in the same area but not a regulatory tax is 18 U.S.C.
1407 (1964), which requires narcotic addicts and violators
to register whenever they enter or leave the country, or face
a fine of up to $1,000 or imprisonment of one to three year
or both.
The four considerations applied by the Supreme Court
to decide the cases of Marchetti, Grosso and Haynes when
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol4/iss2/11
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applied to the above regulatory statutes provide interesting
questions. If we assume that there exist stiff state laws dealing with narcotics and marijuana, then the registration under
the above federal statutes may be "real and appreciable"
hazards against self-incrimination. An often heard contra
argument is that the individual who wishes to engage in such
regulated activities has waived the privilege. Such an argument was rejected in Marchetti." The above statutes-especially Section 1407, requiring registration on entering and
leaving the country might be said to be aimed at a highly
selective group inherently suspect of criminal activities. This
consideration was used in Marchetti to distinguish the Sullivan case where the defendant was required to file an income
tax return. Whether the true purpose of the above statutes
is to collect tax revenue may be evidenced by the tax imposed
on those dealing in marijuana, which ranges from $1 to $3
per year except for an importer, who must pay $24 a year. 7
The only consideration which the marijuana and narcotic
regulatory tax statutes may satisfy is the public nature of
the information required since the taxpayer must furnish
only his name, place of business, and place of business
activity.4" Yet that information may be all that is required
for a conviction under a state statute.
Another interesting regulatory statute is Section 7011
which imposes a general registration requirement similar to
those just discussed, on all those liable for other special taxes.
This includes those liable for registration and taxation on
stills under Section 5179. Comparison of these two statutes
with the four considerations outlined by the Supreme Court
in Marchetti, Grosso and Haynes would result in similar reasoning and conclusions as discussed above.
The last regulatory tax statute to be considered is the
Firearms Act passed in June of 19684" which seems to be the
most demanding for information:
Such importers, manufacturers and dealers shall
make such records available for inspection at all
46. Marchetti v. United States, supra note 41, at 52.
47. 26 U.S.C. § 4751 (1964); See also 26 U.S.C. § 4721 (1964) for the imposition of tax on those who deal in narcotic drugs.
48. 26 U.S.C. §§ 4722, 4753 (1964).
49. 18 U.S.C. § 923 (d) (1968).
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reasonable times, and shall submit to the secretary
such reports and information with respect to such
records and the contents thereof as he shall by
regulations prescribe. The secretary or his delegates
may enter during business hours the premises (including places of storage) of any firearms or ammunition importer, manufacturer, or dealer for the
purpose of inspecting or examining any records or
documents required to be kept by such importer or
manufacturer or dealer under the provisions of the
chapter of regulations" issued pursuant thereto, and
any firearms or ammunition kept or stored by such
importer, manufacturer or dealer at such premises.
Upon the request of any state, or possession, or any
political subdivision thereof the Secretary of the
Treasury may make available . . . any information
which he may obtain by reason of the provisions of
this chapter with respect to the identification of persons within such state, or possession, as political
subdivision thereof, who have purchased or received
firearms or ammunition together with a description
of such firearms or ammunition. 1
The effect of the above provision seems to give almost
unlimited access to the business premises and records in an
effort to acquire information. Inspections may be made once
a week, twice a week or three times a day if the Secretary of
the Treasury or his delegate deems it necessary. The Secretary also has the authority to demand any information he
deems necessary. This evidently includes information on any
acts which may by state law be declared illegal. For example
a 1968 Illinois statute lists certain sales of firearms which
are unlawful,52 but are not unlawful for federal purposes.
Yet information required under the Firearms Act may be
used in a prosecution under the Illinois law. From this
example it is clear that the obligation to register and pay
the tax under the Firearms Act may under proper circumstances be a "real and appreciable" hazard of self-incrimination which the Supreme Court considered a relevant factor in
Marchetti,Grosso and Haynes. The fact that the Firearms Act
is aimed at a highly selective group inherently suspect of
50. 26 U.S.C. § 4722 (1964); 26 U.S.C. § 4753 (1964).
51. At the time this article was written no regulations had been published on
what information would specifically be required under this act.
52. ILL. Ra-. STAT. Ch. 38, § 24-3 (1968).
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criminal activities is well illustrated by Section 901 which
states the findings, declarations and purpose for which the
act was passed: The purpose is stated to be to stop illegal
use of firearms by known criminals, youths, etc. Whether
the information to be required is "public" in nature may in
part depend upon what information may be deemed necessary
by the Secretary of the Treasury in the future, acting under
the authority of the act. At this time, however, the complete
freedom to inspect premises and records of dealers, manufacturers and importers of firearms and ammunition as
granted by Section 923 (I) does not seem to be public in
nature. The revenue to be generated from this act ranges
from $10 to $1,000 per year for dealers, importers and manufacturers. While this may seem to be a lot, if such revenue
is compared to the total revenue of the United States Government it is only a small amount. This fact plus Section 901
outlining the purpose of the act makes it evident the Firearms
Act was not enacted principally to collect revenue.
In summary, we see the privilege against self-incrimination given constitutional status during the colonial period
and strengthened by the Boyd decision in 1886. From that
time until January 1968, the Supreme Court yielded to the
governmental need for information by expanding the required
records doctrine on such theories as implied waiver, public
nature of the information, and criminal activities requiring
disclosure. Today, after Marchetti, Grosso and Haynes, the
Court has outlined new considerations to be emphasized which
strengthen the privilege and deny the required information
demanded by governmental needs. As a result the regulatory
statutes in narcotic drugs, marijuana, firearms, etc. requiring
information which satisfy the four considerations as outlined
in Marchetti, Grosso and Haynes will probably be held subservient to the privilege against self-incrimination.
JOSEPH B. TAYLOR
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